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The result of the United Kingdom’s referendum to leave the European Union (EU) in 
June 2016 has set in train possible far-reaching social and economic consequences for 
both the UK and its regions. On 29 March 2017, the UK government initiated the two-
year process by which the UK and the EU will negotiate the terms under which the UK 
will leave the EU, although this period may be extended. In many ways, these are 
unchartered waters, as there has never been a case before where a large country has left 
a customs union.  
The referendum result was not withstanding the predictions of major economic 
forecasting models that agreed that the result of leaving the EU would lead to a 
substantial loss of income for the UK. These include the models of Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (HMT) (2016a,b), the IMF (2016) and the OECD (2016).  The potential loss 
of GDP in 2030, compared with the position if the UK had not left the EU, calculated 
by HMT (2016a) ranges from central estimates of 3.8 percent to 7.5 percent, depending 
upon the outcome of any new trade agreements negotiated with the EU. The loss is 
predicted to be substantially due to the reduction of the UK’s trade with the EU. At 
present, UK exports to the EU account for 45 percent of the UK’s total exports and for 
12 percent of the UK’s GDP.  
In this paper, we discuss the possible implications of Brexit for the UK and, 
particularly, its regions. (The term Brexit is used for the actual leaving of the UK from 
the EU.) We begin by assessing some of the various approaches that have estimated the 
potential short-term and long-term losses arising from the UK’s process of leaving the 
EU. This is done because the differing estimates from the various models at the national 
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level inevitably have different implications for the regions. For example, on the one 
hand, if one accepts the results of, say, the Economists for Brexit (2016a), then Brexit is 
actually likely to have a positive impact on the UK economy and, hence, the regions. On 
the other hand, if one takes the forecasts of the majority of the other economic models, 
then the regional impact will be adverse to varying degrees. 
We shall argue that the impact of Brexit on the UK, and hence its regions, may 
not be as damaging as some of the forecasts above suggest. We shall concentrate 
particularly on HMT (2016a, b) as this was most influential in the referendum debate. It 
also produces similar results to the IMF (2016) and OECD (2016) studies. However, 
this is hardly surprising as they are all based on the same underlying macroeconomic 
model1, and make approximately the same assumptions. Mention should also be made 
of Ottaviano et al. (2014) and Dhingra et al. (2017a) who, using a more sophisticated 
approach, find the losses allowing for dynamic effects to be similar to the upper end of 
HMT’s estimates of the possible loss in the UK’s GDP. The National Audit Office 
(2017) has undertaken a scrutiny of HMT (2016a, b), although without questioning its 
methodology. It notes that the Centre for Economic Performance (2016) criticised HMT 
for being somewhat cautious in its estimates. 
However, it should be noted that there are dissenting views. The Keynesian 
forecasting model of the Centre for Business Research (CBR) (Gudgin et al. 2016a) 
concludes that there would be overall output losses, but they would be much less 
dramatic than those predicted by HMT. The most optimistic dissenting group are the 
                                                          
1 This is the National Institute for Economic Research’s NiGEM which is similar to a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model.   
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Economists for Brexit (2016a, b)2 who, using a different general equilibrium model, 
find that Brexit would lead to a gain in GDP of about four percent.  (See, however, 
Sampson et al. 2016 and Winters 2017. Their critiques of the Economists for Brexit are 
discussed below.) There are also forecasts by other organisations, but for reasons of 
space we shall not consider them here. (See Emmerson, et al. (2016, Table 3.1, p.18) for 
a useful summary of all the major forecasts.) 
We are particularly concerned with the regional dimension of both the referendum 
result and likely resulting economic consequences.  The current regional imbalance in 
the UK, as reflected by the North-South divide, is one of largest in Europe (McCann, 
2016). An important question, consequently, is whether or not Brexit will significantly 
worsen the North-South divide?  
We discuss this by using a demand-oriented post-Keynesian approach to 
modelling the likely effect of Brexit on the regions, a perspective that has not been 
mentioned in any of the recent debates about the effects of Brexit.3 The regional 
balance-of-payments constrained growth model (Thirlwall, 1980; McCombie 1988) is 
an aggregate theoretical model that provides a conceptual framework for discussing the 
impact of Brexit. It is particularly relevant given the likelihood of an adverse demand 
shock resulting in the reduction of trade with the EU. It will be the fall of trade with the 
EU and, to a lesser extent, a decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), that will be 
fundamentally responsible for the loss of the UK’s GDP. This approach analyses the 
impact of a fall in the growth of the regions’ exports and imports on the growth of their 
output.  This also leads potentially to a fall in productivity growth through the Verdoorn 
                                                          
2 They are now retitled Economists for Free Trade (see 
https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/). 
3 Furthermore, there is no mention of this approach in Capello and Nijkamp’s (2010) handbook 
of regional growth theory and development.   
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law, the relationship between the growth of productivity and output (Verdoorn 1949; 
McCombie et al. 2002). The law reflects the impact of increasing returns to scale, 
broadly determined. Unlike in many other cases where the neoclassical and post-
Keynesian models often come to different conclusions, here they are rather similar. 
We begin with a review of a representative sample of the different approaches 
analysing the possible effects of Brexit, although for reasons of space this has to be 
limited. 
 
2 The Macroeconomic Forecasts of Brexit and their Implications for the UK            
Economy  
 
In this section, we consider a number of possible outcomes of Brexit for the whole of 
the UK as a precursor to considering the possible regional impacts. We first consider the 
estimates of HMT (2016a, b) and then those of the CBR (Gudgin et al. 2017a, b) and, 
finally, the more optimistic predictions of the Economists for Brexit.  
HMT (2016b) provides a short-term forecast of the immediate adverse impact on 
output over a two-year period after the vote to leave. HMT predicted that output would 
fall by 3 to 6 percent because of the assumption of the effects of the high degree of 
uncertainty caused by the impending Brexit. However, at the time of writing (October 
2017), this is proving to be over-pessimistic. The actual growth of GDP in 2015 was 2.2 
percent, in 2016 it was 1.8 percent and is forecast by the Office of Budget 
Responsibility (2017) to be 2.0 percent in 2017.4 
                                                          
4 It could be argued that HMT’s (2016b) starting point for its short-term forecast was the date of 
the implementation of Article 50 on 29th March 2017, and the period from the vote to leave until 
this date was merely a period of wait and see. This argument is not compelling. HMT (2016b) 
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Of greater importance are the various long-term estimates of the possible adverse 
effects on the UK’s GDP. HMT’s long-term model takes as its starting point the date of 
Brexit. As noted above, HMT’s (2016a) estimates are expressed as the fall in GDP after 
a 15-year period, compared with the level of GDP that would have occurred if the UK 
had remained in the EU. The 15-year period is chosen as it is assumed that all the 
economic effects of Brexit would have worked themselves out by then. Three scenarios 
are considered in increasing order of disadvantage to the UK. They are (i) the UK joins 
the European Economic Area, (ii) the UK negotiates a Free Trade Agreement with the 
EU and (iii) the UK exits under the default position of the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) “most favoured nation” rule. For expositional purposes, (following Gudgin et al. 
2017a and the National Audit Office 2017), we shall concentrate on the worst-case 
scenario, the WTO outcome, although any of the other two outcomes could be chosen. 
It also enables us to compare Gudgin et al.’s results with those of HMT. 
The methodological approach that HMT adopts is as follows. First, it calculates 
the likely decline in the UK’s exports to the EU using a standard gravity trade model 
(HMT, 2016a, Annex A). This loss of trade is assumed to be the value of the extra UK 
trade that membership of the EU has conferred and which would no longer occur after 
Brexit. Secondly, it estimates the associated decline in UK’s labour productivity 
resulting from this fall in trade. Thirdly, it repeats the exercise to calculate the loss in 
output due to the fall in FDI. Finally, the fall in productivity is treated as an adverse 
technological shock in the neoclassical Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
aggregate production function, with constant returns to scale, used in the NiGEM 
                                                                                                                                                                          
throughout the document refers to the “immediate impact of the vote to leave”. Moreover, the 
National Audit Office (2017, p.4) notes that the short-term forecast “covers the period from 
2016 Q3 to 2018 Q2 immediately following a vote to leave”. The delay in invoking Article 50 
merely lengthened the period of uncertainty. 
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macroeconomic model.5 It is assumed that there is no significant import substitution or 
increased exports to other non EU markets. This, in addition to the fall in output from 
the lost trade, is used to forecast the possible falls in GDP, which can be considerable, 
ranging in the worst case from -3.4 percent to -9.5 percent, with a central estimate of     
-7.5 percent. (The best outcome for the UK has a central estimate of -3.8 percent.) It is 
assumed that the UK labour market is flexible, so that the fall in output does not lead to 
an increase in unemployment. The effects of changes in net migration are not 
considered in these exercises. 
In estimating the gravity model, HMT (2016a, Annex A, Part 1) uses bilateral 
trade flows for goods for 200 countries, over the period 1948 to 2013. (A shorter period 
and fewer countries are used for international trade in services.) In order to quantify the 
effect of EU membership, a dummy variable is included, inter alia, when both trading 
countries are members of the EU. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable 
shows that membership of the EU means that total exports are 76 percent higher, 
compared with WTO baseline. This is the average effect for all members of the EU and 
is assumed to apply to the UK. Consequently, it is assumed that Brexit, under the WTO 
terms, would lead to a decline in the UK’s exports to the EU by 43 percent (i.e., 76/176 
expressed as a percentage) which is equivalent to 24 percent of its total exports. 
The next step in the argument is that this fall in trade is estimated to lead to a fall 
in the level of productivity of 6.25 percent, assuming a productivity–trade elasticity of 
0.25. (HMT 2016a, Part 3. See also Crafts (2016) for a survey of studies that estimate 
                                                          
5 There is a number of serious problems with the both the concept and use of aggregate 
production function and, hence, also for the NiGEM model. See Felipe and McCombie (2012, 





this elasticity.) The NIESR (Ebell and Warren 2016) using the same NiGEM model, but 
making no allowance for a decline in productivity, estimate the loss in GDP to be 
between 2.1 and 3.7 percent. If they allow for productivity effects, the estimates are, not 
surprisingly, similar to those of HMT. (See also Ebell, 2016.) 
HMT also estimate that there would be a decline in FDI of about 20 percent, 
which leads to a further fall in productivity of 0.8 percent, assuming a productivity-FDI 
elasticity of 0.04. On the basis of all these estimates, the worse-case scenario of HMT is 
a central estimate of decline in GDP of 7.5 percent. There is no allowance for the fact 
that Brexit may lead to a fall in the growth of productivity, so these estimates may be 
conservative.  
How plausible are these estimates and the economic methodology of HMT? Let 
us, for the moment, assume that the HMT estimates of the benefits in terms of extra 
trade gained from the UK’s membership of the EU are of the correct order of 
magnitude. Does this necessarily mean the costs of leaving the EU are equal to the 
negative value of this? To answer in the affirmative means that the costs of the UK 
leaving the EU are based on a symmetry assumption or, to put this another way, the lack 
of any path dependence or the absence of hysteresis. In other words, Brexit will lead to 
a loss of all those extra past gains in trade, output and productivity from EU 
membership. But how probable is this?  
First, the assumption that all the productivity benefits from the increased trade 
will be lost is highly implausible. As Alfred Marshall (1890) pointed out long ago, in 
his famous Appendix H, the gains from, for example, increasing returns are to a large 
extent irreversible when production contracts. Likewise, the productivity gains from the 
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extra trade with the EU since the UKs accession in 1973 may be, to some extent, 
likewise irreversible.  
Secondly, there are grounds for questioning the assumption that there will be a fall 
in UK’s exports to the EU equivalent to the estimated increase from its EU membership. 
The decline in UK exports will be the result of the increased EU tariffs and the greater 
costs of compliance with EU trade regulations (i.e., the imposition of EU non-tariff 
barriers). While the benefits of the reduction of tariffs might have been large at the time 
of the UK’s accession to the European Community (as it then was) in 1973, these have 
steadily fallen under trade deals brokered by GATT and the WTO. The average tariff 
facing the exports of non-EU members to the EU is now only about 3 to 5 percent, 
although this does conceal significant sectoral variations. For example, automobiles face 
a tariff of 10 percent. However, 31 percent of agricultural and 2 percent of non-
agricultural products are imported duty free into the EU under the most favoured nation 
rule. As The Economist (2012) put it “exporters routinely have to absorb cost increases 
of this size caused by a surge in the oil price or a jump in the exchange rate”. Indeed, 
the fall of sterling against the euro (as of October 2017) since the referendum of around 
12 percent should offset this possible increase in exporters’ prices.  
Although HMT (2016a) correctly predict this depreciation of sterling in their 
short-term model, the effects are, ironically, not considered in their discussion about the 
long-term effects.  However, Ebell and Warren (2016 p.133) undertake this exercise. 
They find that, because of the low price elasticities of demand for exports, only a very 
small increase in exports (what they term a “bounce-back”) of between 1.6 and 2.4 
percent of exports by 2030 occur from an effective exchange rate decline of 16 and 24 
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percent, under the WTO scenario. This is compared with their estimate of the total 
decline of total UK exports of between approximately 21 and 29 percent. 
This finding is instructive. First, rather than using the gravity model, suppose the 
question is posed another way – what will the likely loss of UK exports to the EU be 
because of the imposition of, say, a 3 to 5 percent average tariff? Estimates of export 
and import demand functions generally give the low values for the relevant price 
elasticities (e.g.  the elasticities in the OBR 2013 and Gudgin et al. 2015 models are less 
than minus unity). This, together with the inferences drawn from Ebell and Warren’s 
(2016) results, suggests that any loss in exports because of the higher relative prices due 
to the tariffs is likely to be small.  
Secondly, a consequence of this is that it must logically be inferred that nearly all 
of the assumed fall in total exports, estimated by using the gravity model, must be due 
to the costs of the imposition of EU non-tariff barriers. But this is implausible. It is 
difficult accurately to measure non-tariff barriers in terms of “ad valorem tariff 
equivalents” (see the World Trade Organisation, 2012). HMT, nevertheless, contends 
that the empirical evidence suggests that non-tariff barriers between the EU and the US 
“increase trade costs by around 10%, making them nearly three times larger than US 
tariffs” (HMT 2016a, Box 1.A p.35). However, it would be very misleading to apply 
this value to the UK, post Brexit. The Conformité Européenne rules have already been 
met by existing UK exporters to the EU and this will still be the case immediately after 
Brexit.  The UK government is planning to incorporate a substantial proportion of EU 
regulations into UK law. Moreover, about 80 percent of the agreed EU standards for 
manufactured goods are voluntary. They have been initiated by EU industry outside the 
EU framework to promote competition. However, this is not to say that non-tariff 
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barriers will not impose any extra costs on UK exporters. Yet PwC (2016, p. 24) 
estimate the effect of non-tariff barriers would only be a tariff equivalent of 1.4 percent 
on exports. Using price elasticities of minus unity, the fall in EU exports and imports 
due to the increase in tariffs and price-equivalent non-tariffs are likely to be around 5 to 
10 percent respectively. This excludes the effect of a depreciation in sterling.  Whatever 
the eventual outcome of the negotiations triggered by Article 50, UK exporters are 
unlikely to find themselves facing a situation where trade conditions and barriers are the 
same as they were before the UK’s accession in 1973. Nevertheless, there is great 
uncertainty around the costs of a “chaotic” or “hard” Brexit. As The UK in a Changing 
Europe (2017) have pointed out, the cost of a “no deal” may be higher than usually 
thought. 
According to HMT (2016a) the benefits of trade for firms include economies of 
scale, increased competition and the improved allocation of capital (HMT, 2016a, Box 
A, p.14). These sit uncomfortably with the assumption of a constant returns to scale 
aggregate production function and profit maximisation by firms in competitive markets, 
as in the NiGEM model. (See also footnote 5.) 
We turn next to the CBR model which is an econometrically estimated Keynesian 
macroeconomic forecasting model, using UK time-series data (Gudgin et al. 2015, 
2017a). A number of assumptions are made in the model to generate estimates of the 
possible impact of Brexit. Gudgin et al. (2017a) find that up until 2020, the lower 
exchange rate offsets the adverse effects of uncertainty. By 2025, with an assumed loss 
of trade with the EU of 20 percent leads to a decline of 2 percent of GDP, compared 
with the position if the UK had remained in the EU.  
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Productivity is only very marginally lower because of the decline in migration, as 
the migrants generally take lower paid jobs, but it is not clear that this is necessarily true 
of EU migrants. While immigration was, in some areas, a major issue in the Brexit 
debate, the increase in the number of EU immigrants tripling from 0.9 million to 3.3 
million had little if any adverse impact on wages or job prospects of UK nationals. The 
fall in wages subsequent to 2008 was due to the financial crisis, not immigration. Many 
of the EU immigrants are better educated and have greater skills than the UK born 
nationals (44% have been educated at the level of higher education compared with 23% 
of UK born nationals). Moreover, the level of employment is not a fixed fund. New 
immigrants generate greater demand and, consequently, greater output and have positive 
effects on the level of productivity (Dhingra et al. 2017a, pp. 30-32). Moreover, there 
seems to be little evidence that immigration has increased income inequality. There is 
also a spatial element to any reduction in the level of migration with Brexit. Migrants 
play a particularly important role in supporting the local economy, such as in London. 
Even regions whose export sector does not depend heavily on the EU may be adversely 
affected economically if there is no freedom of movement and they rely on labour from 
the EU. There is also the unquantifiable psychological impact on currently resident EU 
nationals with the move towards Brexit.6  
 Gudgin et al. (2017a) examine the trade performance of the UK over the postwar 
period. It is found that UK exports to the EU had a trend rate of GDP growth of 6 
percent since 1950, and there was no acceleration subsequent to the UK’s accession in 
1973. They argue that there is no compelling reason to assume that the UK’s growth 
rate of GDP (and productivity) would have slowed down had it not joined the EC. The 
                                                          
6 We are grateful to a referee for these points. 
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annual growth of the UK exports to the rest of the world was just over 3 percent prior to 
1976, but only 1.5 percent per annum from 1976 to 1989. This suggests, according to 
Gudgin et al. (2017a), that, contrary to HMT, there was substantial trade diversion 
(from, for example, trade with New Zealand).  
Moreover, the exports to the EU as a proportion of the UK’s total have been 
slowly declining from nearly 50 percent in 2005 to 42 percent in 2015. On current 
trends, the share would have fallen to 29 percent by 2035 even if the UK had remained 
in the EU (Protts, 2016). (Slater, 2016, finds similar results.)  
Gudgin et al. (2017a) using their Keynesian forecasting model, together with their 
own assumptions, find that the loss in GDP is some 2 percent in 2025. Using HMT’s 
assumptions, their forecasting model gives a loss of 5 percent in 2025 compared with 
Treasury’s 7 percent for 2030.  This suggests that the different assumptions made about 
the degree of the fall in trade with the EU caused by Brexit are crucial. 
In a follow-up paper, Gudgin et al. (2017b) present a detailed reassessment of the 
gravity model results, per se, of HMT (2016b), IMF (2016) and OECD (2016). Gudgin 
et al. (2017b) estimate a number of different specifications of the gravity model, under 
what they assume to be more plausible assumptions. They find that the UK benefits 
from being a member to be less than that of the EU average member, on which HMT’s 
calculations are based. They further conclude that their preferred specification would 
give a loss in goods exports to the EU of 23 percent (p.7). They also found that, using 
more sophisticated estimation techniques, this loss (and conversely the benefits of being 
a member of the EU) has declined over time. They are also sceptical of HMT’s effect of 
the reduction of FDI due to Brexit. This is because the data for FDI used by HMT are 
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for financial flows, much of which is used for mergers and acquisitions, rather than for 
physical investment. It is the latter which is important for increasing GDP (p.8). 
 
The results of estimating gravity models are extremely sensitive to the exact 
specification of the model and estimation procedures used (Glick et al. 2015). 
Consequently, Gudgin et al. (2017b) are cautious about drawing any firm policy 
conclusions about Brexit from this approach. Burrage (2017, Appendix 1) considers 
three other studies that HMT (2016, p.38) cites in support of their own gravity model’s 
results. He considers that HMT’s discussion of the results plays down the serious 
caveats expressed in these studies. (See also Burrage (2016) for a critique of HMT’s 
estimates.) 
The most optimistic forecast of the impact of Brexit is that of the Economists for 
Brexit (2016a) using a model developed by Minford (Minford, et al. 2015). They 
anticipate a gain of 4 percent of GDP, even if the UK leaves under the WTO option. 
This approach is quintessentially neoclassical. First, the UK consumers will benefit 
from not having to pay tariffs on their imports, which are above the world free-trade 
price. Tariffs also cause production distortions leading to overproduction of the 
protected industries, and consequently, to efficiency losses.   
Even under the WTO scenario or unilateral free trade (which the Economists for 
Brexit (2016a) argue is optimal), the UK, as a small country by world output standards, 
will, in effect, face a perfectly elastic demand for its exports when trading on world 
markets.  This is essentially the operation of the law of one price, where identical 
exports face the same world prices in perfectly competitive world markets. This is 
usually considered to be applicable to homogeneous goods, but the Economists for 
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Brexit consider that all exports are bundles of differing characteristics, from which 
consumers can pick and choose.  
Consequently, it is argued that after Brexit, there will be no loss of UK exports as 
exporters can simply sell in other overseas markets. Thus, there will be no output losses 
from reduced access to the EU market. Brexit will lead to productivity gains with the 
improved allocation of resources, even if it means the eventual extinction of UK 
manufacturing, with total reliance on services where they consider UK’s comparative 
advantage lies. The gravity models of HMT, and others, are dismissed as subject to 
selection bias and their parameters are likely radically to change when a shock such as 
Brexit occurs. Sampson et al. (2016) criticise this analysis, as their own model suggests 
that removing import tariffs only increases GDP by 0.3 percent. They also argue that 
“Minford’s model is hard-wired to predict that EU membership is only trade diverting 
and Brexit would lead to higher trade” (p.6). They then cite the gravity model studies 
cited above (and which the Economists for Brexit (2016b) heavily criticise) in support 
of their contention that membership of EU is trade creating and not diverting. But, as we 
have seen, empirically, relative prices play only a minor role in trade. So, the law of one 
price clearly does not hold. Winters (2017) also makes the same point about the 
existence of product differentiation and defends the use of the gravity model. He argues 
that according to Minford’s own model “gaining 4 % requires more integration with 
Europe than the UK has at present”.   
To conclude, even though the gravity model may overstate the trade costs of the 
UK leaving the EU, it still shows that it may not be an easy matter for UK exporters 
simply to switch to other overseas markets. The forecast of an increase in four percent 
of GDP by the Economists for Brexit looks as over-optimistic as HMT’s forecast is 
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over-pessimistic. T he most important issue is whether or not all the gains from the 
UK’s Accession in 1973 will be lost on Brexit. Given the low UK price elasticities for 
exports and imports noted above and the likely price rises due to tariffs and non-tariff 
barrier equivalents, the loss of trade is likely to be much less than that predicted by 
HMT. 
We next turn to the spatial implications of Brexit. 
 
3 Spatial Implications of the Outcome of the Referendum 
 
The result of the referendum was surprising, with 70 percent of those surveyed on the 
day expecting the remain vote to win (Ashcroft, 2016). This is notwithstanding that 
there had been growing disenchantment with the EU since the mid-1990s, as reflected in 
various opinion polls (Swales, 2016, p. 5). 
The reasons behind the outcome of the voting are many and varied. Research on 
the voting patterns suggests that those voting for Brexit were older, on lower incomes, 
had less education and were more likely to live in social housing (Ashcroft, 2016). A 
survey of the reasons of those who voted to leave found that the most important issue 
was one of national sovereignty, followed by immigration. While the level of 
immigration in the Local Authority areas did not seem to have any statistical 
significance in explaining the leave share, the recent increase in immigration over the 
last decade was positively correlated with the leave vote. Only 6 percent of the leave 
voters said that the main reason they voted that way was that they believed the UK 
economy would be better off outside the EU. Clearly, the possible effect of Brexit on 
the economy was not a major factor in deciding the referendum outcome. 
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However, Dorling (2016) points out that most people who voted leave live in the 
South of England and argues that the declining health and living standards in the 
northern regions was not the result of immigration, “but ever growing inequality and 
public spending cuts that accompanied austerity”. What came out of the various 
analyses of the referendum vote was that place matters.  “It’s the shape of [the UK’s] 
long lasting and deeply entrenched geographical inequality that drove differences in 
voting patterns” (Resolution Foundation, 2016).  Goodwin and Heath (2016) found that 
both the less well-educated and those with A-levels and university degrees were 
proportionately more likely to vote for Brexit in the less-skilled areas compared with 
areas with higher-skills. They explain this result in terms of the disillusioned relatively 
well-educated workers lacking the opportunity to take good jobs in the areas where they 
lived and feeling marginalised in society. They concluded that “support for Brexit was 
strongest where a large percentage of the population did not have any qualifications and 
were ill-equipped to thrive amid a post-industrial and increasingly competitive economy 
that favours those with skills and is operating in the broader context of globalisation” 
(2016a, p.5).  
Los et al. (2017) review a number of other studies that consider this question and 
which come to much the same conclusion. Furthermore, using the interregional 
extension to the World Input-Output Database, Los et al. (2017) present statistical 
evidence of what might be termed the “regional Brexit paradox”. This is that on a 
number of indicators such as, for example, the share of a region’s GDP exported to the 
EU, those voting to leave were proportionally greater in those regions that are more 
closely interlinked with the EU and likely to be hardest hit. But, nevertheless, these 
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were the ones that the benefits of globalisation had largely passed by as reflected in the 
deindustrialisation in these regions. 
Dhingra et al. (2017b), however, find that cities in London and the South East are 
likely to experience larger adverse impacts of Brexit than the rest of the country. They 
attribute this to other studies underestimating the importance of non-tariff barriers and 
not taking into account the willingness to substitute domestic goods for imports as trade 
costs rise. Moreover, these cities specialise in the knowledge-based sectors such as 
business and the financial sectors, which are likely to be the hardest hit by Brexit. Thus, 
those areas which voted to remain were, in fact, according to Dhingra et al. (2017b), 
those that would be hardest hit by Brexit.  But they argue that these dynamic cities are 
likely to be the best placed to respond the negative shock of Brexit. 
The outcome of the referendum reflects both the social and economic divisions in 
the UK. In this sense, the results of the voting stem from a failure of post-war economic 
policies to reduce regional disparities and the North-South divide. However, the vote to 
leave the EU may actually worsen the regional disparities in the future to some degree. 
 
4 The Economic Implications of Brexit for the UK Regions 
 
What are the likely output implications of Brexit for the UK regions? The predictions of 
severity of the impact will depend upon the plausibility of the estimates of the various 
studies discussed above. 
The UK has a larger degree of regional inequality than any other major OECD 
country (McCann, 2016). The UK’s coefficient of variation in regional per capita 
income at the NUTS-2 level is double that of any of the EU’s other five largest 
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economies (Bell, 2017, p. S101). Los et al. (2017) and McCann (2016) describe the 
divergence of the economic performance of London and its hinterland and the 
remainder of the UK regions.  
Thus, even if the short-term and the long-term consequences of Brexit have been 
overestimated by HMT, inter alia, Brexit could have serious adverse effects for the UK 
regions and cities, exacerbating the North-South divide (Springford, 2015; Sheffield 
Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) 2016). There is also a much greater 
disparity on dependence on the EU at the city level. According to the Centre for Cities 
(2017, Figure 9, p. 19), Exeter and Plymouth are the most heavily dependent on the EU 
for their exports, with 77 percent and 68 percent going to the EU respectively.  At the 
other extreme is Hull and Derby, with only 29 percent and 25 percent respectively.  
Also the value of total exports per employee varies considerably between cities, ranging 
from £40,650 (Sunderland) to York (£3,710). Thus, the implication is that the impact of 
Brexit will vary spatially to a great extent and it risks worsening the North-South divide 
(Springford, 2015; SPERI 2016, Los et al. 2017).   
A problem is that the potential adverse effect of Brexit is not just a question of the 
proportion of exports of a region or city that goes to the EU. It also involves their supply 
chains and the extent to which these are located in other regions and cities (Immarino 
and McCann 2013 and McCann 2016, chapter 4). There are important industries, such 
motor vehicles and aerospace, that have complex supply chains of intermediate inputs 
that criss-cross the EU border (KPMG, 2014; HMT, 2016a, Box 1.c, p.40).  After 
Brexit, these industries will have to face new EU tariffs and compliance procedures on 
multiple occasions, even though they may be compliant with existing ones. The export 
of services to the EU is important and is also likely to have a spatial impact. The impact 
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on the financial services sector, if passporting fails to be granted by the EU, will largely 
hit Central London. However, it should be noted that while there are 400,000 employees 
in the financial services in London, there are 85,000 and 98,000 employees in this sector 
in Scotland and the North West, respectively. 40 percent of J.P. Morgan’s staff are 
based outside London (HMT 2016a, Box 1.D; p.42). Thus, the impact on the financial 
services is likely to be more regionally widespread than is commonly thought. 
While the regional automatic economic stabilizers will come into play after 
Brexit, much will also depend upon the degree of government support for the hardest hit 
regions and cities. The degree to which the government makes up for the loss in EU 
regional funding will be a further important factor. Norton (2017) argues that one 
benefit of Brexit is that it will give the UK government greater discretion in which areas 
regional aid is given. Bachtler et al. (2016) and Bell (2017) discuss the possible options 
for regional policies post Brexit.  
An important consequence of the fall in regional demand caused by Brexit is that 
it will have a different impact compared with other recessions in the post-war period. 
This is because economic recovery has to be export-led. Merely increasing demand in 
the regions will lead to interregional balance-of-trade problems, and consequently can 
only have limited success. We next illustrate this argument using the regional balance-
of-payment constrained growth model.   
 
5 Post-Keynesian Regional Growth Theory and the Impact of Brexit 
 
 In this section, we analyse the effect of Brexit using a demand-oriented growth model. 
This approach has its origins in an influential paper by Kaldor (1970). Kaldor’s verbal 
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model was formalised by Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) and forms the basis of the 
cumulative causation model of growth. The key assumption is that the growth of a 
region’s output is primarily dependent on the growth of its exports, working through the 
dynamic Harrod-trade foreign trade multiplier and, more generally, the Hicks super-
multiplier. As such, the model represents a formalisation and extension of the traditional 
export-base model of regional activity (North 1955) within a macroeconomic 
framework. See, for example, Rowthorn (2010, Appendix 1) for an application to the 
UK.  
The cumulative causation nature of growth is given by the Verdoorn law 
(McCombie et al. 2002). In its simplest form, this is a relationship between the growth 
of manufacturing productivity and output. A faster growth of the output causes a faster 
growth of the productivity, through induced technical change and both dynamic and 
static returns to scale. (See, for example, Angeriz et al. (2008)).   In the original Dixon 
and Thirlwall (1975) model, the growth of nominal wages is the same across regions, 
being set in national markets. The model predicts either convergence to an equilibrium 
growth rate or explosive growth depending upon the parameters of the model. However, 
there are two problems with this approach. First, empirical evidence suggested that 
firms competed largely through non-price factors, i.e., trying to shift the demand curve 
for their firm’s product outwards, rather than moving down the demand curve 
(McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994, Chapter 4).   
 Secondly, there is nothing in the model to prevent the growth of imports 
permanently exceeding the growth of exports, which has to be financed by an increasing 
growth of net financial flows. This led to the development of the balance-of-payments 
constrained growth model, which is equally applicable to the national or regional level 
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(Thirlwall and Dixon, 1979). As Thirlwall (1980) comments “Regional problems are 
‘balance-of-payments’ problems”. The model, in its simplest form, is as follows. The 
growth rates of exports and imports are given by the following export and import 
demand functions expressed in growth rates.  
 
𝑥 = 𝜀𝑧 + 𝜓(𝑝𝑅 − 𝑝𝑍 − 𝑒)                                                                                     (1)  
                                                                               
where x is the growth of exports,  is the income elasticity of demand for the region’s 
exports, z is the weighted growth of the region’s export markets, 𝜓 (< 1) is the price 
elasticity of demand for the region’s exports, 𝑝𝑅 is the growth of the price of the 
region’s exports, 𝑝𝑍 is the growth of prices of the region’s imports and 𝑒 is the rate of 
change of the exchange rate. We are assuming here, for simplicity, that the region trades 
only with overseas markets. 
The import demand function is given by: 
 
𝑚 = 𝜋𝑦 + 𝜂(𝑝𝑍 + 𝑒 − 𝑝𝑅)                                                                     (2)
     
with the same notation as above and additionally where 𝑚 is the growth of imports, 𝜋 is 
the income elasticity of demand, and 𝜂 (< 0) is the price elasticity of demand for 
imports. The balance-of-payments accounting identity is given by: 
    




where 𝑓 is the growth of net capital inflows and 𝜌 is the share of exports in total 
receipts. The constraint arises because, as we have noted, in the long run, a region 
cannot finance a growing trade deficit indefinitely by the growth of extra-regional 
borrowing. Consequently, we assume that the growth of exports and imports must be 
equal in the long run. The importance of the regional balance of payments has often 
been overlooked because there cannot be a regional currency crisis. As Dow (1986) has 
pointed out, the fact that with a national banking system, a region’s bank loans do not 
have to be matched by deposits in the region may give the impression that financial 
flows are automatically accommodating. But they are not. As output and employment in 
the region falls, any attempt to maintain private consumption necessitates borrowing, 
but this will be increasingly limited by the decline in the value of regional collateral and 
the increasing ratio of regional debt to regional output. Credit rationing will occur or the 
interest rate for borrowing will increase or, more likely, both. Thus, a fall in exports will 
set in train a negative multiplier effect as regional consumption falls. The rate of 
investment in the region is also likely to decline. Moreover, there are already regional 
fiscal transfers from the more prosperous areas of England subsidising not only 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, but also the less prosperous parts of the UK 
(Oxford Economics 2008; McCann 2016, Chapter 5, section 5.3.2)). Apart from the 
limited operation of the automatic fiscal stabilisers, it is unlikely that there will be any 
significant increase in the rate of growth of interregional government transfers to the 
hardest hit regions.  
 If we assume that there are no net capital flows, then equation (3) becomes the 




𝑥 = 𝑚 + 𝑝𝑍 + 𝑒 − 𝑝𝑅                                                                             (4) 
 
 
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into (4), we obtain an equation for the regional 





(𝜀𝑧 + (1 + 𝜂 + 𝜓)(𝑝𝑅 − 𝑝𝑍 − 𝑒))                                           (5) 
 
Empirically, the price term is found to be quantitatively unimportant as the growth 
of relative prices do not diverge greatly in the long run, i.e. (𝑝𝑅 − 𝑝𝑍 − 𝑒) ≈ 0. This 








                                             (6) 
 
 The effect of the growth of relative prices can also be negligible because the 
Marshall-Lerner conditions are barely met (𝜂 + 𝜓 ≈ −1). 
Differences in regional growth rates are primarily a result of differences in the 
ratio of the income elasticities of demand, which capture differences in non-price 
competiveness, including the structure of production. A region where the structure of 
production is specialising on, say, steel is likely to have an income elasticity of demand 
for exports that is lower than a region specialising in hi-tech goods.  
A problem with Thirlwall’ s law is that as Tiebout (1956) raised with reference to 
the export-base model, there is no role for the growth in the non-tradable sector to affect 
the regional growth rate. 
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The answer to this conundrum is that equation (6) should be regarded as a simply 
a locus of the growth rates of the region, where the region is in balance-of-payments 
equilibrium for any given z. However, there is an additional equation for the growth of 
regional demand (𝑦𝐷) that is derived from the Keynesian aggregate demand function. 
This is given by: 
 
𝑦𝐷 = 𝛼𝑎 + 𝛽𝑥 = 𝛼𝑎 + 𝛽𝜀𝑧                                                                                (7) 
 
 
where a is the growth of “autonomous” expenditure and  and  are the dynamic 
multipliers. Equation (7) does not take into account whether or not the balance of 
payments is in equilibrium (see McCombie, 1993, for the full model). Consequently, the 





= 𝑦𝐷 = 𝛼𝑎 + 𝛽𝜀𝑧                                                                                 (8) 
 
If the growth of exports falls, say, with Brexit, the region will start to run a 
balance-of-payments deficit. As this cannot persist for the reasons set out above, the 
growth of the “autonomous” expenditures (which, in this sense, are not really 
autonomous) will decline. For example, as mentioned above, negative wealth effects 
will reduce the growth of consumption and regional investment will be curtailed. This 
brings the growth of regional aggregate demand back into line with the now lower 
growth of regional output that is consistent with the trade being in balance.  
We are now in a position to consider the regional impact of Brexit. First we 
consider the immediate, or short-run impact, of Brexit. Consider first the effect of the 
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imposition of a tariff on exports. The demand for a region’s exports in logarithmic form 
is given by:    
 
𝑙𝑛𝑋 = 𝑙𝑛𝐶0 + 𝜃𝜀𝐸𝑈𝑙𝑛𝑍𝐸𝑈 + (1 − 𝜃)𝜀𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝜃𝜓𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑅(1+𝜇)
𝑃𝐸𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑈
) + (1 − 𝜃)𝜓ln (
𝑃𝑅
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊
)     (9) 
 
with the same notation as before, but where the upper case denotes a level. EEU and 
EROW are the region’s exchange rate with the EU and the Rest of the World respectively. 
𝜃 is the share of the UK’s exports going to the EU and  is the percentage value of the 
EU tariff imposed after Brexit. This last has an effect of reducing the level of the 
region’s exports to the EU, and hence output, as 0)1ln(/ln  X .  will also 
decline with the tariff increase. It follows that for a particular region, the greater the 
share of its exports that go to the EU, the greater will be its decline in output. 
Furthermore, the greater the ratio of the region’s exports to its output, for a given share 
of exports to the EU, the greater also will be the fall. The position with respect to 
imports from the EU is the mirror image of the above, although given the structure of 
regional demand, the share of EU imports in output and total imports is unlikely to vary 
across regions as much as exports.  
Nevertheless, given the low empirical estimates of the price elasticities discussed 
above, the fall in exports and imports are not likely to be substantial. The fall in exports 
may also be offset by a depreciation of the exchange rate by an equivalent amount to the 
increase in the tariff, as has already occurred at the time of writing. Under these 
circumstances, the imposition of the tariff would again have little, or no effect, on the 
region’s exports to the EU. Furthermore, because of the multiplicative nature of the 
export demand function, the imposition of a tariff will not affect the growth of exports, 
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or imports, unless the tariff continuously increases over time. The fall in the exchange 
rate will further increase the price of imports in terms of the domestic currency, sterling, 
which ceteris paribus, will lead to a fall the real wage. If there is real wage resistance, 
these may lead to an increase in domestic prices eventually offsetting the depreciation. 
The Economists for Brexit, as we have seen, advocate unilaterally cutting all existing 
tariffs of imports into the UK, which would counteract this to some extent.  
The second result of Brexit is the imposition of non-price trade barriers, which is 
interpreted here as a fall in the income elasticities of demand for exports and imports. 
The non-price barriers include the effect of the disruption of international supply chains. 
It is noticeable that the gravity models estimated by HMT (2016) and Gudgin et al. 
(2017b) do not include a relative price term.  
The fall in the income elasticity of demand for exports will cause a fall in the 
region’s exports. As with the imposition of a tariff, a greater fall in output, ceteris 
paribus, will occur for two reasons. The first is when there is a greater share of exports 
to the EU in the region’s total exports. The second is when, for any share of exports to 
the EU in the region’s total exports, there is a greater share of exports in total output. 
The greatest effect is when both these occur. 
If there were no increase in the non-tariff barriers for imports, and therefore no 
initial fall in imports, the total fall in regional output would be greater than just that of 
the fall in exports. The reason is that for balance-of-payments equilibrium, imports 
would have to fall to match the decline in exports. Consequently, imports fall through 
the import demand function as income, or equivalently, output declines. Through the 
workings of the Hicks super-multiplier (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994, Chapter 6) this 
requires income to fall by more than the decrease in exports. However, the imposition of 
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non-price tariffs causes imports to fall in addition to that caused by the decline in 
income. Consequently, under these circumstances the fall in regional income will be 
commensurately smaller than under the first scenario.  
Turning to the effect on long-run growth, because of the results from the gravity 
model that show being a member of the EU increases the trade between the UK and the 
EU, ceteris paribus, we assume that 𝜀𝐸𝑈 >  𝜀𝑅𝑂𝑊 and 𝜋𝐸𝑈 > 𝜋𝑅𝑂𝑊. For expositional 
ease, we assume that 𝑧𝐸𝑈 is equal to 𝑧𝑅𝑂𝑊, which we denote by 𝑧. But this is not 
essential to the argument. Brexit and the increase in non-price tariffs results in an 
immediate one-off proportionate fall in 𝜀𝐸𝑈 and 𝜋𝐸𝑈 .  The balance-of-payments growth 








𝑧                                                       (10) 
 
 
A bar across the notation for the elasticities of demand indicates that they are the 
aggregate values. We assume that the region under consideration is more dependent on 
the EU for its exports than its imports, and so 𝜃 > 𝜔. In other words, the region 
specialises more than the UK (or the average region) in exporting to the EU.   
After Brexit, the growth of the region is given by: 
 










𝑧                                         (11) 
 
where the prime denotes a post-Brexit different value.  𝜀𝐸𝑈
′ , 𝐸𝑈
′ ,  and   are smaller 
than the pre-Brexit values. 
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 The aggregate income elasticity of exports has fallen more than the aggregate 
elasticity of imports, because of the greater share of EU exports compared with EU 
imports and the fall in both EU and EU. Thus, comparing the equilibrium growth rates 
we have:  








𝑧                                                                             (12) 
 
 
This change in growth rates is shown in Figure 1. The line BP0 is the initial locus 
of the region’s balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate and is given by the 
equation  /zyBP  .  The line A0 A0 is the region’s growth of aggregate demand, given 
by equation (8). The initial output growth of the region consistent with its balance of 
payments being in equilibrium is consequently given by y at the point a where the 
growth of its export markets is given by z0. With Brexit,  /  falls to   /   for the 
reasons set out above. This causes the balance-of-payments equilibrium locus to rotate 
downwards to BP1.  If the region’s growth remains at its initial rate where y equals a, 
then the proportion of the region’s growth rate given by the distance ab will have to be 
financed by a growth of largely interregional borrowing by the region. As we noted 
above, this is not sustainable in the long run, and, consequently, the regional demand 
equation shifts down to A1 A1. The region’s growth is now given by the point where y 
equals b. Consequently, Brexit has led to a permanently slower growth of the region. 
The position is more complicated than this because the slower rate of growth of exports 
will also impact on the growth of other regions that supply intermediate inputs into the 
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region’s exports. Also the slower growth of exports of the region will lead to the slower 
growth of  imports from other regions, thereby propagating the deflationary forces. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The model shows the ineffectiveness of government policy that merely boosts 
regional aggregate demand. This may shift the A1A1 line back to A0A0, but, as we have 
noted, this will have to be financed by increasing interregional capital transfers. An 
increased sustained growth of the region requires the more difficult problem of 
increasing the non-price competitiveness of its exports and the search for new overseas 
markets. In other words, rotating the BP1 line back to BP0 . 
A fall in the growth of regional exports, and hence, of regional output is likely to 
lead to a fall in the growth of productivity, through the Verdoorn law, further reducing 
the region’s competiveness price and especially non-price competitiveness (Angeriz et 
al. 2008). 
In the long run, the growth of productivity will be lower unless the region finds 
other export markets and increases its rate of growth of exports. In a Keynesian world, it 
is unlikely that wage flexibility will lead to the labour market clearing and so 
unemployment, or underemployment, will increase. Indeed, the post-Keynesian analysis 
shows that cutting real wages by cutting regional aggregate demand may make the 
unemployment situation worse (McCombie, 1985). (See Thirlwall (1980, p.424) for an 
analysis of the change in regional unemployment in a balance-of-payments constrained 
growth framework.) 
For the UK as a whole, the story is a little different. In this case, trade with the EU 
is approximately in balance. 
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Consequently, it follows that: 
 







𝑧                                                              (13) 
 
An equiproportional decline in the income elasticities of demand for imports and 
exports will mean that the balance-of-payments growth rate is unaffected by Brexit. 
However, as we have seen, the level of GDP will decline in the short run from the loss 
of exports, if there is no compensating increase in domestic production to offset this fall. 
Hence, the subsequent growth of the UK will be from a lower base. How a region 
responds to the impact of Brexit is a function of its economic resilience to an economic 
downturn. There is a large number of studies examining how resilience differs between 
the regions. (See, for example, Martin et al. 2015; Haldane 2016.)  Often output 
declines with the onset of the recession, but, with recovery, growth typically accelerates 
for a short period of time until eventually the level of output and productivity are the 
same as if there had been no recession. There has, however, been a cumulative loss in 
output over this time. But as we have shown, according to the balance-of-payments 
constrained model (and HMT, 2016a), Brexit, however, causes a fall in exports that 
leads to a permanently lower level of output, compared with the baseline. To this extent 
this approach and HMT come to the same conclusion.  Brexit is also likely to reinforce 
the deep-seated trends of deindustrialisation as exports are predominantly 
manufacturing goods and increase the North-South divide. 
 




This paper has considered the possible implications of Brexit for the UK regions. There 
has been a number of differing forecasts at the national level of the impact of Brexit. 
Consequently, we began with a critical review of the models behind these forecasts as 
the impact on the regions depends crucially on the adverse effects of Brexit at the 
national level. 
First, we started by considering the worst case (WTO option) estimates of the 
influential HMT (2016a) analysis. A key factor in their methodology was to estimate the 
extra gains in trade the UK had achieved by being a member of the customs union since 
its accession in 1973 to the European Communities, as the EU then was. It was then 
assumed that all these gains would be lost after Brexit. This assumes no path 
dependency or hysteresis and HMT provided no justification for this procedure. An 
alternative preferable methodology is to look at the disadvantage UK trade with Europe 
would face in terms of increased tariffs and non-tariff price equivalents resulting from 
Brexit. The trade loss can then be calculated using import and export demand functions 
and the estimates of the price and, especially, the income elasticities in demand. While 
it is beyond the scope of this paper precisely to quantify the results, the estimates of the  
decline in trade are less than the estimates of HMT.  
Secondly, the CBR (Gudgin et al. 2017b) successfully replicated the HMT results 
of their gravity model. However, they then corrected for a number of misspecification 
errors in the model. These included the specification that the estimated trade impact in 
the HMT analysis was for all the EU members, and not just the UK. Correcting for this 
and other specification errors, they found that the impact on the UK is much smaller 
than the estimates of  HMT (2016a).  
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Furthermore, Gudgin et al. (2017a) using the UKMOD Keynesian forecasting 
model, together with their own assumptions find that the loss of GDP is considerably 
less that of HMT. However, if they use HMT’s more severe assumptions in their model 
they get similar results. 
 The Economists for Brexit’s positive estimate for the impact Brexit on GDP, 
relying as it does on the law of one price, are generally considered to be over-optimistic. 
 We finally analysed the effect of Brexit using the regional balance-of-payments 
constrained growth model. This is a highly aggregate model (but no more so than the 
Solow-Swan and other neoclassical growth models). The purpose was to provide a 
conceptual framework within which to analyse the possible effect of Brexit. It was 
shown that, in the case where we model the increase in non-tariff barriers as a decrease 
in the income elasticities of demand, withdrawal from the EU is likely to cause a 
widening of regional disparities. Those regions which are more heavily dependent on 
trade with the EU will experience the greatest adverse effects. In the case of the UK as a 
whole, Brexit will cause a short-run one-off loss in GDP, but not necessarily a decline 
in its long-term growth rate.  
 Consequently, the post-Keynesian approach comes to much the same conclusions 
as the mainstream approach, which is not always the case. However, inevitably, the 
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